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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent political developments have brought new significance to a long-
standing debate about when regional organizations may legally authorize the
use of military force against member states without prior authorization by the
United Nations Security Council.
The most striking examples of these developments have occurred in
Africa in reaction to the repeated failure of the United Nations to halt civil
wars and other humanitarian crises. When African states transformed the
Organization for African Unity into the African Union (AU) eight years ago,
they granted the new organization the authority "to intervene in a Member
State ... in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and
crimes against humanity." ' A year earlier, the heads of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which had been involved in
t J.D. expected, Yale Law School, 2008. 1 would like to thank Professors Michael Doyle
and Lon Fisler Damrosch for their comments regarding this Note. I am deeply indebted to Jesse Brush,
Christina Andersen, and the other editors of The Yale Journal of International Law for their patience,
insight, and advice.
I. Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4, para. h, July 11, 2000, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/23.15 (May 26, 2001) [hereinafter AU Charter], available at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/AboutAU/Constitutive-Act-en.htm.
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several military conflicts during the 1990s, signed a protocol on conflict
management. This document authorized ECOWAS to take measures,
including the use of military force, to prevent humanitarian disasters and
"serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law," and to
protect or restore democratically elected governments against unlawful
coups. 2 Since the enactment of these two agreements, the United States has
spent several hundred million dollars to train and equip African military
forces to intervene in the continent's crises.
African states are at the forefront of the development of such treaties,4
but similar proposals have been made elsewhere. For example, several
scholars have proposed the creation of pro-democracy pacts that would have
the authority to use military force to protect signatory democratic
governments against coups. 5 In 2000, participants in U.N.-mediated
negotiations over Cyprus discussed treaty provisions that would have allowed
other nations to intervene in case of conflict. 6 And in 2007, Senator John
McCain, now his party's presidential nominee in the 2008 election, proposed
that the United States found a "League of Democracies"; although the powers
of the proposed "League" remain unclear, McCain has suggested that it would
have the authority to intervene to halt humanitarian suffering if the United
Nations failed to act.
7
This Note analyzes the legality of the use of force pursuant to these
kinds of treaty clauses, known as "guarantee clauses." It concludes that
guarantee clauses can offer a legal basis for the use of military force against a
treaty signatory, though the use of force pursuant to a guarantee clause is
subject to jus cogens norms of international law. The Note concludes with a
discussion of several policy considerations that merit consideration during the
drafting of guarantee clauses.
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part ii considers the relationship
between the U.N. Charter framework and regional organizations, the primary
multilateral organizations envisioned during the founding of the Charter, and
examines the general legal authority that regional organizations possess to
authorize the use of force, both under a traditional, clause-bound view of the
Charter and under the more permissive view of international law prevalent in
contemporary debates.
Part III turns to guarantee clauses and argues that states may use them to
"contract around" the general legal prohibition on the use of force. This
2. Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peace-Keeping and Security art. 25, Dec. 10, 1999, ECOWAS Doc. A/P10/12/99 [hereinafter ECOWAS
Conflict Protocol], available at http://www.sec.ecowas.int/sitecedeao/english/ap101299.htm. The
Conflict Protocol has not been ratified by all member states.
3. NINA M. SERAFINO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., The Global Peace Operations Initiative-
Background and Issues for Congress 1-2 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/RL32773.pdf.
4. For a general overview of the evolution of Africa's collective security landscape, see
Jeremy 1. Levitt, Pro-Democratic Intervention in Africa, 24 Wis. INT'L L.J. 785 (2006).
5. See, e.g., Morton H. Halperin, Guaranteeing Democracy, 91 FOREIGN POL'Y 105 (1993).
6. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Panel Discussion at The Yale Journal of International Law's Sixth
Annual Young Scholars Conference (Mar. 1, 2008).
7. John McCain, An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 19 (Nov.-Dec.
2007).
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contractual power, however, is limited: it can be used only against treaty
signatories, and all uses of force must be consistent with jus cogens norms of
international law. These limitations have the effect of minimizing the
concerns of critics who may worry that guarantee clauses, no less than other
uses of force lacking U.N. authorization, present a Pandora's box of potential
abuses.
Part IV explores four classic case studies in which authorization by a
regional organization served as at least a partial legal basis for military action:
the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the American-led invasion of Grenada in
1983, ECOWAS's intervention in the civil war in Liberia during the 1990s,
and NATO's bombing campaign on behalf of Kosovo in 1999. Each case
study analyzes the treaty-based legal arguments advanced to support the
intervention and assesses the strength of those arguments in light of the
framework developed in Part III. Part IV also offers a hypothetical assessment
of a fifth case, a potential intervention by the AU against a member state.
Finally, Part V addresses policy considerations related to the drafting of
guarantee clauses.
II. THE AUTHORITY OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE U.N.
CHARTER
This Part discusses the authority of regional organizations to use force
within the U.N. Charter framework. It begins with a classical account of the
use of force within the U.N. framework and concludes that, as originally
understood, the Charter did not grant regional organizations the authority to
use force without prior U.N. authorization. The Part then considers more
recent, flexible interpretations of the right to use force within the Charter
framework. It concludes that although there is growing support for the use of
force even without U.N. approval-particularly for humanitarian
interventions-deep divisions remain over the legality, as opposed to the
legitimacy, of such action. The next part, Part III, will argue that guarantee
clauses can help to close that gap by providing a legal basis for such uses of
force.
A. A Classical View of Regional Organizations' Authority to Use
Force Under the U.N. Charter
The delegates who arrived in San Francisco in April 1945 to draft the
United Nations Charter wanted to establish a new international order
outlawing aggressive warfare. To that end, Article 2(4) of the Charter
provided that member states "shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.,
8
The delegates were divided, however, on the question of whether the
new order would be guaranteed by a centralized United Nations or whether
8. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
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regional collections of states would take primary responsibility for
maintaining regional peace. In fact, discussion of the relationship between
regional organizations and the United Nations was "second only to the
question of voting procedure in the Security Council as a source of bitter
argument." 9 Although the United States and the other major Allied powers
had already agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that regional organizations would have
a role in the postwar world, widespread disagreement remained over crucial
details regarding powers of regional organizations-in particular, whether
regional organizations would be permitted to use military force without prior
authorization from the United Nations.' 0
With memories of Germany's remilitarization of the Rhineland fresh in
their memories, French delegates wanted a unilateral right to use force against
Germany or another Axis power were it to begin remilitarization. I I
Accordingly, they proposed that the U.N. Charter grant individual states or
groups of states the right to take measures, including the use of force, "'in the
interest of peace, right, and justice,"' if the Security Council found itself
paralyzed due to a veto.12 Moreover, Australia introduced a similar proposal
that would have granted regional organizations the authority to "adopt such
measures as they deem just and necessary for maintaining or restoring
international peace and security" were the Security Council to fail to act
against a threat to the peace.'
3
Latin American delegations, on the other hand, pressed for a broader
role for regional organizations within the Charter framework. To this end, a
month before the San Francisco conference, Central and South American
states had signed the Act of Chapultepec, which was a hemispheric pact
binding its signatories to take collective action "in case acts of aggression
occur or there are reasons to believe that an aggression is being prepared by
any other State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, or against
the sovereignty or political independence of an American State." 14 In
particular, Part II of the Act of Chapultepec called on American states to enter
into negotiations to establish a permanent mutual defense treaty, 5 which the
Latin American delegations in San Francisco anticipated would lead to the
creation of a formal hemispheric organization-the Organization of American
States (OAS). Although negotiators representing the United States had
insisted that the Act of Chapultepec stipulate that "the said [hemispheric]
arrangement . . . shall be consistent with the purposes and principles of the
[United Nations], when established," 16 Latin American states were
"determined to uphold the inter-American system as the basis of security...
9. Michael Akehurst, Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies, with Special Reference to
the Organization ofAmerican States, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 175, 175 (1967).
10. RUTH RUSSELL & JEANETTE MUTHER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 398-
99 (1958).
11. See id. at 690.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace pt. 1, 4, Mar.
8, 1945, 60 Stat. 1831 [hereinafter Act of Chapultepec].
15. Id. pt. I1.
16. Id. pt. III.
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in the Western Hemisphere."' 7 Meanwhile, Arab delegations in San Francisco
hoped to protect the nascent Arab League's authority within the Charter
world.' 8
Eventually, the delegates struck a two-part compromise on the authority
of regional organizations. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter legitimated collective
defense agreements by providing that the Charter would not "impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs."'
9 Further, Chapter VIII (Articles 52-54) provided an explicit role for
regional organizations to operate within the Charter framework. Careful
analysis of both Article 51 and Chapter VIII, however, shows that the Charter
framers did not intend to grant regional organizations the legal authority to use
force-except in self-defense-absent authorization by the U.N. Security
Council.
The first half of this compromise, Article 51, provides that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council .... 20
In recent years, Article 51 's scope has been the subject of tremendous debate
regarding whether the phrase "if an armed attack occurs ''21 or subsequent state
practice has legalized, or at least legitimated, preventative military action22
against an emerging threat to peace. Regardless of the ultimate meaning of
"self-defence" under Article 51, however, it is clear that the Article offers
regional organizations no special authority to use force. Instead, the plain
language of the Article-"the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs" 23-makes clear that the right to use force
in self-defense remains the same whether it is exercised by an individual state
or a collection of allied states. Article 51 provides a regional organization with
the legal authority to use force only insofar as it provides an individual
member state of the regional organization with the legal authority to do so.
The general question of the scope of the self-defense right under Article 51
has been widely debated elsewhere and is beyond the scope of this Note.
24
The second half of the compromise, Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter-
Articles 52 through 54--establishes a positive role for regional organizations
within the Charter framework. The text and structure of Chapter VIII,
however, show that it does not grant regional organizations the legal authority
to use force without prior Security Council approval.
17. RUSSELL & MUTHER, supra note 10, at 693.
18. See Akehurst, supra note 9, at 176.
19. U.N. Charter art. 51.
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law. Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence
in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 547-48 (2002); W.
Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense,
100 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (2006).
23. U.N. Charter art. 51.
24. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 22; Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 22.
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Article 52 states that the Charter should not be read to preclude regional
organizations' authority over "matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided
that such arrangements ... are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of
the United Nations. '25 Members of the United Nations that enter into regional
arrangements "shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local
disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies
before referring them to the Security Council. 26 Article 52 also provides that
the Security Council should encourage the use of regional arrangements in the
settlement of disputes.
27
Article 53 provides that the Security Council "shall, where appropriate,
utilize . . . regional arrangements . . . for enforcement action under its
authority. 28 But Article 53 contains a sharp limitation on the authority of
regional organizations to act independently of Security Council authorization:
"no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council., 29 Article
54 requires regional organizations to keep the Security Council apprised "of
activities undertaken or in contemplation . . . for the maintenance of
international peace and security."
30
The plain language of these articles makes clear that while the Charter
permits-indeed, even encourages-regional organizations to take measures
to protect regional peace, it does not grant regional organizations the authority
to use force without receiving Security Council authorization. Article 52
encourages states to use regional organizations for the "pacific settlement" of
disputes but makes no reference to military options. Article 53's prohibition
on "enforcement actions," meanwhile, should be read as prohibiting "the use
of force" in light of its use of the phrase "enforcement action"; the Charter
fails to define the phrase, but links it to "the use of force." 3! Article 5, for
example, provides for the suspension of U.N. members against which the
Security Council has taken "preventive or enforcement action,"32 suggesting
that the two are qualitatively different. Article 45 then draws a link between
"enforcement" and "the use of force": "In order to enable the United Nations
to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available
national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement
action." 33 This link between "military measures," "air-force contingents," and
25. U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 1.
26. Id, para. 2.
27. Id. para. 3. A limiting clause makes clear that members of regional organizations retain the
right to bring any dispute to the attention of the United Nations and that the Security Council retains the
authority to investigate any dispute. Id para. 4.
28. Id. art. 53, para. I.
29. Id. Article 53's prohibition on the use of force by regional organizations contains a limited
exception for the use of force against former Axis powers. Id. art. 53.
30. Id, art. 54.
31. In French, the Charter uses the phrase action coercitive where the English document uses
"enforcement action." The literal translation of action coercitive would be "coercive action." The
Spanish, medidas coercitivas, is similar to the French.
32. U.N. Charter art. 5.
33. Id. art. 45.
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"enforcement action" strongly implies that the phrase "enforcement action"
refers to the use of force.
The minutes of the meetings of the U.S. delegation in San Francisco
provide additional support for this interpretation of the Charter.34 Indeed, the
U.S. delegates simply assumed that the Charter would preclude the OAS or
other regional agencies from using military force without prior Security
Council authorization: when Senator Arthur Vandenberg (the head of the U.S.
delegation) asked Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy whether the
requirement of Security Council authorization for enforcement actions by
regional organizations was acceptable to American military officials, McCloy
replied that the "military and naval advisors were willing to concede that force
should not be used without the authorization of the Security Council., 35 The
minutes also indicate that there was heated debate about whether to exempt
enforcement actions by particular regional organizations from the requirement
of prior Security Council authorization-in particular, whether Chapter VIII
should have been changed to permit particular regional organizations to use
military force if needed to prevent a recurrence of events like those leading up
to the Second World War.
36
Ultimately, the drafters included only one narrow exception to the
prohibition on enforcement actions without Security Council approval:
language within Article 53 created a limited exception for regional
organizations to take enforcement actions against former Axis powers to halt a
renewal of aggressive policy on the part of the states defeated in World War
II. 37 This decision to include a specific exception authorizing regional
enforcement actions against the former Axis powers would have been
redundant if the Charter generally permitted regional organizations to use
force without Security Council authorization.
B. Contemporary Views of the Use of Force Within the U.N. Charter
Framework
In recent years, international human rights activists as well as scholarly
commentators have challenged the traditional understanding of the U.N.
Charter as forbidding the use of force without authorization by the U.N.
Security Council. In the wake of the apparent inability of the United Nations
to stop post-Cold War humanitarian crises in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo,
and driven by emerging threats to global security such as international
terrorist groups, legal scholars have advocated a flexible approach to
international law that would accommodate changing circumstances even if the
formal foundational text of the world legal order-the U.N. Charter-remains
unchanged. Scholars have suggested that actions by states (or coalitions) may
34. Diplomatic Papers, The United Nations conference on international organization, San
Francisco, California, Apr. 25-June 26, 1945, in [1945] 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 592 (emphasis added).
35. Id (emphasis added).
36. See id. at 567-710.
37. U.N. Charter art. 53.
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come to be accepted as legitimate, and possibly legal, as new criteria develop
for assessing the legitimacy and legality of future actions.38
Some of the most significant reassessments of the international law of
the use of force have come in the area of humanitarian intervention. A
growing body of legal and political commentary suggests that the international
legal order should permit either individual states or coalitions of willing
nations to use their own forces to stop humanitarian catastrophes (particularly
state-sponsored genocide) if the United Nations fails to act. Former State
Department Legal Advisor Abraham Sofaer has expressed his support for a
"common lawyer" approach to interpreting the U.N. Charter that would, for
example, recognize the legality of NATO's 1999 humanitarian intervention in
Kosovo on the grounds that "under all the relevant circumstances presented,
the action was reasonable in light of the Charter's provisions and purposes."
39
Another scholarly commentator, Ruth Wedgwood, has cited former U.N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan to argue that the "developing international
norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter"
40
challenges the traditional, absolutist understanding of Article 2(4)'s
prohibition on the use of force. The International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty's 2001 report, The Responsibility to Protect, argued that
"[s]tate sovereignty implies responsibility" and that "[w]here a population is
suffering serious harm . . . and the state in question is unwilling or unable to
halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international
responsibility to protect." ' Nevertheless, the Commission argued that the
United Nations should retain responsibility for authorizing interventions.
Scholars have also argued for an evolutionary approach to the law of
anticipatory self-defense in the wake of the United States-led invasion of Iraq
in 2003.42
Another group of critics challenges the idea that legality should play a
controlling role in international relations and has proposed to open a "gap"
between the legality and the legitimacy of the use of force. Michael Glennon,
for example, has argued that in the wake of the Iraq war, "'[l]awful' and
'unlawful' have ceased to be meaningful terms as applied to the use of force"
and that the old order was toppled by "[p]ower disparities, cultural disparities,
and differing views on the use of force. ' 43 While Glennon's vision of the total
collapse of the legal order remains a minority view, a significant number of
38. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 82, 86-90 (2003).
39. Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (2000).
40. Ruth Wedgwood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 834 (1999)
(quoting Press Release, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report
to General Assembly, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7136 (Sept. 20, 1999)).
41. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, at xi (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf.
42. See John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 563, 573-74
(2003). Anne-Marie Slaughter has argued that "[w]hat we are witnessing today is an unruly process of
pushing and shoving toward a redefined role for the United Nations. Practices have to evolve without
formal amendment.... [D]epending on what we find in Iraq, the rules may have to evolve, so that what
is legitimate is also legal." Anne-Mane Slaughter, Good Reasons for Going Around the U.N., N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at A33.
43. Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 16, 24, 30 (May-
June 2003).
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scholars have suggested that the international legal order incorporate a degree
of illegality by recognizing the legitimacy of interventions, particularly for
humanitarian purposes, while continuing to deny their legality. This approach,
in which legitimacy turns on the substantive goals and outcome of an
intervention independent of its legal basis, was crystallized by the
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, headed by former South
African Supreme Court Justice Richard Goldstone, which concluded that
NATO's 1999 bombing campaign that ended atrocities in Kosovo was "illegal
but legitimate":
44
It was illegal because it did not receive prior approval from the United Nations Security
Council. However, the [Independent International] Commission considers that the
intervention was justified because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and
because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of Kosovo
from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule.
4 5
Antonio Cassese articulated similar sentiments in a 1999 essay, noting that
while "few states have endeavored to translate [the Kosovo campaign] into
legal terms," 46 the international "opinio necessitatis"-the belief that the
action was necessary to prevent massive human rights violations-"was
strong and widespread.
4 7
In a recent article, Professor Monica Hakimi has begun to address the
issue of regional organizations in this evolving view of the international order.
Hakimi argues that a split between the international community's continued
formal endorsement of Article 2(4)'s prohibition against the use of force and
its periodic toleration for the unauthorized use of force, particularly by
regional organizations like ECOWAS and NATO, is giving rise to "two
different legal regimes": a "legal" one requiring U.N. authorization for the use
of force, and an "operational" one that tolerates or condones certain
unauthorized uses of force. 48 Noting that regional organizations like
ECOWAS and NATO have mounted several interventions without U.N.
authorization, Hakimi argues that, as a practical matter, the international
community's acceptance of the legitimacy, if the not the legality, of these uses
of force depends on the substantive ends achieved, the procedural processes
that an organization employs when authorizing the use of force, and the
characteristics of the regional organization, in particular, the connection
between the organization, the target of the action, and the controls over the
particular use of force at issue.49
44. INTERNATIONAL INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT:
CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 4 (2000).
45. Id. at 4.
46. Antonio Cassese, A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio
Necessitatis, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 791, 795 (1999).
47. Id. at 798.
48. Monica Hakimi, To Condone or Condemn: Regional Enforcement Actions in the Absence
of Security Council Authorization, 40 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 643, 647 (2007).
49. Id. at 679-83. For another recent analysis of the issue of regional organizations' authority,
see Dana Michael Hollywood, It Takes a Village... or at Least a Region. Rethinking Peace Operations
in the Twenty-First Century, the Hope and Promise of African Regional Institutions, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L.
75 (2007).
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In the next Part, I propose that guarantee clauses can offer a partial
solution to this gap between the legality and legitimacy of uses of force by
giving regional organizations the express legal power to authorize the kinds of
interventions-notably humanitarian interventions-that, as Hakimi, Cassese,
and others note, the international community is already coming to regard as
legitimate.5 °
III. GUARANTEE CLAUSES: INTERVENTION AUTHORIZED BY TREATY
This Part discusses the legality of guarantee clauses under international
law. It begins with a discussion of the history of guarantee clauses in the pre-
Charter world and argues that their legality survived the creation of the United
Nations in 1945. Since the use of force pursuant to a guarantee clause is
grounded on the consent of signatory states, guarantee clauses do not violate
Article 2(4)'s prohibition of the use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of states. The Part then discusses jus cogens limits on
the use of guarantee clauses and proposes that jus cogens norms can serve as a
type of boundary on the use of force that would prevent the abuse of guarantee
clauses. Finally, the Part argues that guarantee clauses offer a normatively
desirable mechanism for regulating the use of force absent U.N. authorization.
Pre-Charter customary international law held that states could enter into
guarantee clauses that legitimated the use of force within their territory under
specified circumstances. In 1863, for example, Greece, Great Britain, France,
and Russia concluded a treaty that, inter alia, provided that "Greece, under the
sovereignty of Prince William of Denmark, and the guarantee of the three
courts, forms a monarchical, independent, and constitutional state, ' '5 1 and this
treaty served as a legal justification for intervention in Greece in 1916.52 In
1903, Cuba and the United States signed the Treaty of Havana, in which the
Cuban government granted the United States a right to intervene to protect
"life, property, and individual liberty. 53 Teddy Roosevelt cited this Treaty in
1906 to justify dispatching troops to quell unrest in Cuba.54
Treaties conferring a general right of intervention fell out of favor by the
start of the Second World War and today evoke distasteful memories of
colonial imperialism. 55 Treaties conferring a right of intervention under
limited circumstances, however, continue to the present day: for example, the
1977 treaties granting Panama control over the Panama Canal expressly grant
50. For a discussion of the gap between legality and legitimacy, see Tania Voon, Closing the
Gap Between Legitimacy and Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from East Timor and
Kosovo, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 31 (2002).
51. Treaty Relative to the Accession of Prince William of Denmark to the Throne of Greece,
July 13, 1863, reprinted in 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 75, 76 (Supp. 1918).
52. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 318 (1963); see
also LASSA OPPENHEIM & RONALD F. ROXBURGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 225 (1920).
53. Treaty Between the United States and Cuba Embodying the Provisions Defining the
Future Relations of the United States with Cuba, U.S.-Cuba, May 22, 1903, 33 Stat. 2248 [hereinafter
Treaty of Relations].
54. See GlobalSecurity.org, 1906 Cuban Pacification Campaign,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/cuba06.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
55. See David Wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
607, 614-15 (1995).
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the United States a perpetual right to use military force to ensure that the
Canal remains open and free to American traffic.
56
Customary international law traditionally recognized the legality of
intervention pursuant to such treaties because the intervention was not seen as
violating the territory or political independence of a state. The 1920 edition of
Lassa Oppenheim's influential treatise International Law, for example,
provided that:
Wherever there is no right of intervention ... an intervention violates either the external
independence or the territorial or personal supremacy [of a state]. But if an intervention
takes place by right, it never constitutes such a violation because the right of intervention
is always based on a legal restriction upon the independence or territorial or personal
supremacy of the State concerned, and because the latter is duty bound to submit to the
intervention.
57
For Oppenheim, treaty provisions authorizing intervention created a valid
right for a treaty party to intervene under the circumstances specified in the
treaty. 58 Other early twentieth-century legal treatises also accepted the
legitimacy of guarantee clauses, with one treatise writer noting that such
agreements "were particularly common in the nineteenth century.
Although the U.N. Charter's supremacy clause provides that Charter
obligations prevail over other international agreements,6° there are several
reasons to believe that the Charter did not preempt this customary law practice
of permitting states to enter into guarantee clauses authorizing intervention
within their territory.
First, the plain language of Article 2(4)'s prohibition on the use of force
applies to force used "against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations. ' 61 But force used with the consent of a legitimate government
violates neither the territory nor the political independence of a state-indeed,
it is an incident of the political independence of a government that it possesses
the authority to bind itself to treaty agreements.
56. See Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal,
U.S.-Pan. annex A(b)(1), Sept. 7, 1977, 33 U.S.T. 1 ("[I]f the Canal is closed, or its operations are
interfered with, the United States of America and the Republic of Panama shall each independently have
the right to take such steps as each deems necessary, in accordance with its constitutional processes,
including the use of military force in the Republic of Panama, to reopen the Canal or restore the
operations of the Canal, as the case may be.").
57. OPPENHEIM & ROXBURGH, supra note 52, at 223.
58. Id. at 225-26. Oppenheim also believed that a state's failure to adhere tojus cogens norms
of international law created a general right for any other state to intervene to stop the violation. "If a
State in time of peace or war violates such rules of the Law of Nations as are universally recognized by
custom or are laid down in law-making treaties, other States have a right to intervene ..... Id.
59. GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (1910). But see
AMOS S. HERSHEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW 149-50 (1912). Although Hershey
thought that intervention pursuant to a guarantee clause could be legally justified, he questioned the
legality of treaties that guaranteed particular dynasties or forms of government on the grounds that they
may "constitute a denial of one of the essential rights of independence." Id. at 150 n. 13.
60. U.N. Charter art. 103.
61. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
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The writings of several post-Charter scholars support this view, and it
receives some additional support from both the International Court of Justice
and from resolutions of the United Nations itself. Ian Brownlie's treatise,
International Law and the Use of Force by States, for example, stated that
"[s]tates may lawfully confer by treaty a right to intervene by the use of armed
force within the territorial or other legally permitted limits of their
jurisdiction."62 Sean Murphy has suggested that the consent of member states
provides a reason for according deference within the Charter framework to
actions by regional organizations against their own members:
A loose interpretation of Article 52 is tolerable in situations where a regional
organization is pursuing enforcement action against one of its own members in
accordance with the constituent instruments of the organization. In such a case, the
member state voluntarily enters into a regional arrangement that cedes certain elements of
its sovereignty to the decisionmaking of the regional organization . . . . It is when the
action of the nonmember state does not rise to the level of an armed attack yet
nevertheless threatens the peace that Secunty Council authorization under Article 53 is
presumably needed.
63
In its influential Nicaragua decision, the International Court of Justice
also suggested, in dicta, that intervention at the request of a legitimate
government was permissible under international law. "[I]t is difficult," the ICJ
concluded, "to see what would remain of the principle of non-intervention in
international law if intervention, which is already allowable at the request of
the government of a State, were also to be allowed at the request of the
opposition.
' 64
The debates surrounding at least two U.N. resolutions relating to armed
intervention also lend support to this view. Debate on a 1965 General
Assembly resolution condemning armed intervention, for example, "was
largely limited to unwelcome intervention. Only Argentina and Jamaica
addressed intervention by invitation, and both took the position that it did not
violate international law." 65 Finally, General Assembly Resolution 3314,
which defines "aggression," implicitly recognizes that states can enter into
agreements for the active use of armed force within their territory: it provides
that aggressive acts include "the use of armed forces ... which are within the
territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in
contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement., 66 By defining
aggression to include the use of armed force exceeding host-state
62. BROWNLIE, supra note 52, at 317. But see W. Michael Reisman, Editorial, Termination of
the USSR's Treaty Right ofIntervention in Iran, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 144, 151-52 (1980).
63. SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING
WORLD ORDER 342-43 (1996).
64. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 126 (June 27)
(emphasis added). See generally David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and
Host-State Consent, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 209, 214-15 (1996) (arguing that most states accept
that an incumbent government may legitimately invite external military intervention).
65. Davis Brown, The Role of Regional Organizations in Stopping Civil Wars, 41 A.F. L.
REv. 235,268 (1997).
66. G.A. Res. 3314, art. 3, § e, at 143 (annex), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974); see also Christopher J. Le Mon, Junior Fellow's Note, Unilateral
Intervention by Invitation in Civil Wars: The Effective Control Test Tested, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
741, 753 (2003).
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authorization, Resolution 3314 suggests that the use of armed force consistent
with such authorization does not amount to aggression that would violate
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
Viewing guarantee clauses as consistent with international law does not
render Article 53's prohibition on "enforcement actions" "under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security
Council" meaningless, which would raise a possible objection to whether
guarantee clauses could really be consistent with the Charter's language.
67
Article 53 prohibits regional organizations from taking military action against
nonmembers or in ways inconsistent with the authority conferred by a
regional organization's particular guarantee clause; use of force consistent
with a regional organization's guarantee clause does not trigger Article 53
concerns because it simply never rises to the level of a possible violation of
Article 2(4).
There remains a question, however, over whether the use of force
requires the consent of the host-state government at the time force is used or
whether a prior treaty agreement can trump the present wishes of the state
government. For example, if a state has signed a treaty authorizing a
multinational organization to use force to prevent crimes against humanity but
subsequently objects to the multinational organization using force against that
state to stop its own criminal acts, does the state's prior agreement to the
treaty provide the organization with sufficient legal authority to use force in
the face of the present objection?
The limited scholarly opinions to consider this issue to date-often
ancillary to other arguments-have reached mixed conclusions. Morton
Halperin and Tom Farer, for example, have argued that a treaty provision
signed by a democratic government to authorize intervention to preserve the
democratic regime should override objections raised by a nondemocratic
successor government that came to power through unconstitutional means.
68
David Wippman has argued that while a treaty-based right of intervention
should ordinarily be seen as revocable, in the context of civil wars or other
conditions of societal disintegration, no one faction (including the formal
government) should be deemed to possess the authority to revoke an
agreement made prior to the conflict.69 At the other end of the spectrum,
Michael Reisman, writing about Iran's 1979 repudiation of a treaty that
authorized the Soviet Union to intervene to protect certain Soviet interests in
Iran, argued that "insofar as [armed intervention] is not invited by that state in
that particular instance, it impairs its political independence" in violation of
67. U.N. Charter art. 53.
68. See Tom J. Farer, The United States as Guarantor of Democracy in the Caribbean Basin.
Is There a Legal Way?, 10 HuM. RTS. Q. 157 (1988); Halperin, supra note 5, at 105. Malvina
Halberstam has argued for the existence of an emerging international norm in favor of prodemocratic
intervention. Malvina Halberstam, The Copenhagen Document Intervention in Support of Democracy,
34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 163 (1993). For articles criticizing prodemocratic intervention as illegal-though
without addressing the issue of pro-democratic intervention authorized by treaty-see, for example, Ved
P. Nanda, U.S. Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human Rights Activists?: The Validity of
United States Intervention in Panama Under International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1990); and
Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J INT'L L. 645 (1984).
69. See Wippman, supra note 55, at 630-32.
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Article 2(4)."0 Careful analysis, however, suggests that prior agreement to the
treaty trumps the state's current objection as long as the treaty is otherwise
valid and the use of force in the given instance does not violate a jus cogens
norm of international law.
International law obligates a state to respect treaty obligations unless the
state withdraws from, denounces, or suspends its participation in a treaty, or
unless a particular treaty provision is invalid. The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, the basic international framework governing treaty
interpretation, states that "the validity of a treaty or of the consent of a State to
be bound by a treaty may be impeached only through the application of the
[Vienna] Convention. ' '71 Under the Convention, withdrawal or nullification of
a treaty is permissible only pursuant to the provisions of the underlying treaty,
or if the parties were deemed to have intended to allow withdrawal, or under a
number of circumstances expressly defined by the Convention. Most of these
circumstances are narrowly defined, including treaties signed under the threat
of force or treaties in which one party's representative was coerced, corrupted,
or fraudulently induced to sign.72 The Convention also grants limited rights of
withdrawal or termination if performance is impossible or if circumstances
that were an "essential basis" for the conclusion of the treaty have
fundamentally changed. 73 None of these limited provisions can be squared
with a purported state right to shirk a treaty obligation to permit intervention
pursuant to a guarantee clause simply because the state has changed its mind
about whether intervention is desirable.
The Vienna Convention contains, however, two broader provisions
regarding the nullification of treaties, both related to jus cogens norms. Under
the Convention "a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts
with a peremptory norm of general international law," 74 and, likewise, "[i]f a
ncw pcremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing
treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates. 75
While there is a great deal of debate over the precise scope ofjus cogens
in international law, several norms are widely accepted-notably, prohibitions
against aggressive warfare, slavery, genocide, and possibly other grave human
rights crimes.76 Scholarly literature also suggests that the right to political self-determination of peoples represents a jus cogens norm. 7 7
70. Reisman, supra note 62, at 152 (emphasis added). Although Reisman rejected the legality
of treaty-based intervention, he has been one of the foremost advocates for a general international law
norm that would permit unilateral or collective intervention for humanitarian purposes or to preserve
democratic regimes. See, e g., W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling
Democracies, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 794 (1995).
71. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 42, § 1, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
72. Id. arts. 48-52.
73. Id arts. 61-62.
74. Id. art. 53.
75. Id art. 64.
76. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga
Omnes, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1996) ("The legal literature discloses that the following
international crimes arejus cogens: aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, piracy,
slavery and slave-related practices, and torture.").
77. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 489 (6th ed. 2003)
("Other rules which have [jus cogens] status include ... the principle of self-determination.").
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These norms are important to understanding guarantee clauses, because
under the Vienna Convention these norms would serve as a type of boundary
on the legal use of force pursuant to a guarantee clause. Although this Note
has argued that guarantee clauses are generally legal, a guarantee clause
purporting to authorize the use of force in violation of a jus cogens norm--for
example, to support a colonial regime against a popular uprising (a
contravention of national self-determination)-would be invalid under the
Vienna Convention.
The jus cogens limitation addresses several potential policy objections to
guarantee clauses, 78 as well as similar objections raised more generally against
any use of force without U.N. authorization, specifically that permitting the
use of force pursuant to a guarantee clause (or, more generally, permitting any
use of force without U.N. authorization) will open the door to widespread
armed conflict and abuse, as major powers coerce smaller nations into signing
guarantee clauses and use force to serve their own national interests. First,
many abusive clauses-like the colonial regime example-would be void in
light of the jus cogens norm favoring the self-determination of nations, a norm
that would sharply curtail the ability of great powers to abuse guarantee
clauses. Second, the fact that guarantee clauses can be used to authorize force
only against signatory states helps to ensure that guarantee clauses will
operate only under a limited range of reasonably desirable circumstances,
particularly to protect basic human rights and, possibly, to support democratic
regimes, since states are unlikely to agree to a guarantee clause absent
assurances that it will prevent abusive intervention within their own territory.
The African Union, for example, drafted its guarantee clause to authorize
intervention only to prevent war crimes, genocide, or crimes against
humanity, while ECOWAS's clause also permits pro-democratic intervention.
These limits may reflect concerns that, in light of the African experience, the
risk of abuse and the possibility of collateral damage as a consequence of
intervention outweighed the possible benefits of permitting intervention under
a broader range of circumstances.
79
Although the legal arguments made in this Part in principle apply not
only to regional organizations but to other collections of states inclined to sign
guarantee clauses, as a policy and practical matter, channeling guarantee
clauses through the charters of regional organizations-as opposed to bilateral
agreements or treaties between small numbers of states-provides a check on
abuse. While regional organizations are often dominated by one or a few
major regional powers, individual powers are less likely to be able to impose
their will in the context of a regional organizations given that smaller states
can bargain collectively to ensure that their interests are represented.
Furthermore, regional organizations typically have a deliberative
78. See, eg., Reisman, supra note 62, at 153 (expressing concern about abuse by more
powerful states directing intervention toward weaker neighbors).
79. Admittedly, hard cases may arise regarding treaties that authorize intervention for a
narrow national interest, like the United States's right to intervene in Panama to keep the Panama Canal
open to American ships. See Wippman, supra note 55, at 681-84 (arguing that while the Panama Canal
Treaty did not authorize the U.S. invasion of Panama to depose dictator Manuel Noriega in 1989, the
treaty could have been used as the legal basis for a more limited intervention).
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decisionmaking process and voting procedures may require a supermajority
vote to authorize action, both of which provide checks on abuse that would
not be present when a state or an ad hoc coalition decides to use force
unilaterally. Indeed, historical evidence suggests that even if one power
dominates a given regional organization, the requirement that it negotiate to
secure approval for a particular intervention can serve as a significant check
against the abusive use of force.
80
IV. CASE STUDIES OF INTERVENTION BY REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
This Part uses five case studies to explore the legality of treaty-based
intervention in concrete detail. Four of the case studies are historical uses of
force by regional organizations: the OAS authorization of the Cuba blockade
in 1962, the U.S.-led invasion of Grenada in 1983, the ECOWAS intervention
in Liberia in 1990, and NATO's bombing of Kosovo in 1999. These historical
case studies show how treaty provisions have been used to justify
intervention, and also provide the opportunity to assess the legality of specific
interventions within the framework developed in Part III. The fifth and final
case study considers the legality of a hypothetical intervention pursuant to the
African Union's guarantee clause.
81
Each of the four historical case studies is a classic in the international
law literature. This Note, however, examines only the strength of legal
arguments related to the purported treaty basis of each intervention-it does
not take a position on whether other types of legal arguments offer additional
or alternative legal bases for a particular intervention. Indeed, the absence of a
treaty basis for a particular intervention does not preclude its legality under
alternative legal theories-for example, self-defense or the "common lawyer"
approach to international law discussed in Part 11 above.
80. For example, despite U.S. dominance of the OAS, it was constrained in its response to the
Cuban missile crisis. In fact, the United States chose the quarantine in part because it thought that the
OAS would support the action. See ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISES: INTERNATIONAL
CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW 68 (1974). Likewise, Nigeria, the dominant ECOWAS power, "frequently
had to compromise on ECOMOG's goals and tactics in order to maintain a consensus within ECOWAS
for continued involvement within Liberia." David Wippman, Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the
Liberian Civil War, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS
156, 192 (Lon Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993).
It is important to note that while channeling guarantee clauses through regional organizations
reduces the risk of coercion, it does not entirely eliminate the possibility of abuse. Indeed, under certain
circumstances, regional organizations-the Warsaw Pact may have been a notable example-might be
understood as little more than coerced agreements between regional hegemons and their weaker
neighbors. As a practical matter, however, contemporary regional organizations tend to be multipolar,
and while it is important to be aware of the potential for abuse created by the unequal bargaining power
prevalent in contemporary international relations, neither of the regional organizations' guarantee
clauses signed to date (AU and ECOWAS) appears to give disproportionate advantage to any given
nation.
81. The case studies do not consider the long-term practical ramifications of the interventions
for the various parties involved. Part V provides a general discussion of some of the practical
difficulties-particularly resource shortages-that regional organizations face when attempting to mount
an intervention.
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A. The OAS Authorization of the Cuban Quarantine in 1962
Although policy considerations were predominant in the Kennedy
administration's internal debates over the U.S. response to the discovery of
Soviet nuclear missile installations in Cuba in 1962, Kennedy and his top
advisers wanted to ensure that any U.S. action was grounded in international
law. Since the Soviet Union would veto any U.N. resolution condemning the
missiles-much less a resolution authorizing a U.S. response-the United
States decided to seek a resolution from the Organization of American States
providing legal authorization for a naval blockade of the Castro regime.
82
American states, including Cuba and the United States, had signed the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty) in 1947 to
"assure peace, through adequate means, to provide for effective reciprocal
assistance to meet armed attacks against any American State, and in order to
deal with threats of aggression against any of them." 83 The Treaty provided
for a joint American response to armed attack, 4 and more broadly, authorized
collective action in any instance where
the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political
independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an
armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact
or situation that might endanger the peace ofAmerica.
8 5
The Rio Treaty also stipulated the range of possible measures that American
states could take in response to a threat, including the "recall of chiefs of
diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular
relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or . . .
communications; and use of armed force."86 It contained a supermajority
provision requiring two-thirds of members to authorize collective action, but
any duly authorized decision was binding on all members with the exception
that no member state could be "required to use armed force" without that
state's consent.
87
OAS member states met on October 23, 1962,88 and pursuant to the Rio
Treaty, voted to recommend:
[T]hat the member states . . . take all measures, individually and collectively including
the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of
Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and
related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to
prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capabilities from ever becoming an active
threat to the peace and security of the Continent .... 89
82. CHAYES, supra note 80, at 25-40.
83. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance pmbl., Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, 21
U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter Rio Treaty].
84. Id. art. 3.
85. Id. art. 6 (emphasis added).
86. Id. art. 8 (emphasis added).
87. Id. art. 20.
88. President Kennedy first announced the quarantine the day before the OAS vote, but he did
not implement the quarantine until he had received formal authorization for the OAS.
89. Council of the Org. of Am. States, Resolution of the Provisional Organ of Consultation
(Oct. 23, 1962), in 47 DEP'T ST. BULL. 720, 723 (1962).
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The State Department's legal memorandum justifying the quarantine
under international law relied heavily on this authorization as the legal basis
for the naval blockade. First, the State Department argued that the Soviet
installation of nuclear missile sites in Cuba amounted to, in the words of the
Rio Treaty, a "fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America" that
could justify collective action under the Rio Treaty:90
The recommendation contained in the [OAS] Resolution for the use of armed force...
was thus fully authorized by the terms of the Rio Treaty .... [The blockade] represents a
minimal use of force to achieve the stated objectives. The United States action thus falls
within the terms of the OAS resolution.
91
The State Department then analyzed the OAS resolution within the U.N.
Charter framework. It argued that the OAS resolution was consistent with
Article 52's explicit recognition of a right to enter into regional arrangements
"'consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations,"'
particularly in light of drafting history suggesting that the framers of the
Charter envisioned a broad role for regional organizations in the maintenance
of international security. 92 Finally, the memorandum addressed Article 53's
prohibition on enforcement actions by arguing that the OAS measure did not
compel, but merely authorized, a member state to take action; the resolution
was not an "enforcement action" within the meaning of Article 53.93
Although the State Department memorandum did not focus directly on
the issue of Cuba's constructive consent to the blockade through its
membership in the OAS, the State Department's Legal Advisor during the
Cuban Missile Crisis, Abram Chayes, offered Cuba's consent as a key legal
justification in his influential book, The Cuban Missile Crisis: International
Crises and the Role of Law. "As a party to the O.A.S. Charter and the Rio
Treaty, Cuba had assented to the powers and proccdures of the organization.
Its case was therefore very different from that of a non-member of a regional
organization, against whom the organization had moved.,
94
90. Memorandum of Dep't of State on the Legal Basis for the Quarantine of Cuba (Oct. 23,
1962), in CHAYES, supra note 80, app. III, at 141 [hereinafter Meeker Memorandum] (quoting Rio
Treaty, supra note 83, art. 6).
91. Id. at 143.
92 Id. at 144-45 (quoting U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 1). The United States did not invoke its
right to self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. According to Chayes, the Administration
feared that labeling the missile placement an "armed attack" would "amount to a full-scale adoption of
the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense" and set an unfavorable precedent that would legitimate military
action by other nations facing similar circumstances-a step that it was hesitant to take at the height of
the Cold War. Id. at 47, 63.
93. Id. at 147-48.
94. Id. at 53. Chayes conceded that an objection could be raised that, earlier in 1962 the OAS,
acting in response to a U.S. request, had enacted a resolution declaring that Cuba's adoption of
Marxism-Leninism "excludes the present Government of Cuba from participation in the inter-American
system." Resolution VI, Exclusion of the Present Government of Cuba From Participation in the Inter-
American System, reprinted in STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFF., 92D CONG., INTER-AMERICAN
RELATIONS: A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATION, DESCRIPTIONS OF INTER-AMERICAN
ORGANIZATIONS, AND OTHER MATERIAL PERTAINING TO INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS 184 (Comm. Print
1972). In response, Chayes cited a memorandum that the Kennedy administration had prepared while
considering the legal issues raised by the U-2 spy-plane overflights of Cuba, which had also been
authorized by the OAS. This memorandum concluded that the resolution "did not expel Cuba from the
Organization nor release her from obligations under existing treaties"; instead, it merely prevented the
Castro government from participating in OAS committees and other institutions until it renounced
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The American legal justification came under contemporaneous attack
from the Soviet Union and, in later years, in several scholarly articles.
95
Critics generally argued that the blockade did amount to an "enforcement
action" under Article 53 of the U.N. Charter and thus required prior
authorization by the Security Council. 96 Critics, however, failed to consider
the rationale articulated in Part III of this Note, that Cuban consent to the Rio
Treaty provided a legal basis for the quarantine. Indeed, Quincy Wright, one
of the leading critics, conceded that the blockade might have been legal
against Cuban ships "on the ground that as a member of OAS Cuba had
constructively consented and so was legally bound by it." 97 Wright thought,
however, that the OAS "resolution could not.., affect the rights of the Soviet
Union, against which the quarantine was primarily directed.'
Under the framework developed in Part III the legality of the Cuban
blockade is a close case. Cuba's signature on the Rio Treaty provided Cuban
consent to OAS use of force under a wide range of actions: any situation that
threatened the peace of the Americas, a threshold that the installation of
Soviet missiles undeniably met. The blockade was duly authorized by the
OAS pursuant to its internal procedures, and it did not violate any jus cogens
norms of international law. It was, rather, a limited and proportional response
to the threat to hemispheric peace. Finally, Wright's objection, that the
blockade was illegal against Soviet ships, seems misplaced. Although the
Vienna Convention provides that a treaty cannot impose an obligation on a
third-party state without that state's express consent, 99 the blockade was
fundamentally directed at Cuba's right to receive missile components, not the
Soviet right to ship them.
That said, a 1962 OAS resolution suspending Cuba's communist
government from actively participating in the organization weakens
arguments that Cuba's signature on the Rio Treaty served as consent to the
OAS blockade. Temporary exclusion from participation in a regional
organization in response to a regime change should not vitiate guarantee
clauses. For example, an authoritarian regime that came to power after
deposing a democratic government should not be able to claim that its
exclusion from participating in a regional organization nullified a
prodemocratic guarantee clause. On the other hand, a regional organization's
communism. Draft Memorandum of the Dep't of State Legal Advisor on Legal Issues Involved in OAS
Surveillance Overflights of Cuba (Sept. 29, 1962), in CHAYES, supra note 80, at 137. The memorandum
also noted that, while the Rio Treaty contained a provision permitting a state to withdraw from its
obligations on two years notice, at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Cuba had taken no steps to do
so. As the memorandum noted,
Cuba [had] taken no formal action to denounce or abrogate the Rio Treaty or any other
inter-American treaty or to withdraw from the OAS. Important rights and obligations
running in her favor by virtue of the treaties, other than the right to sit in the organs of the
inter-American system, still subsist.
Id. at 137. Chayes conceded that this last argument had "soft spots." CHAYES, supra note 80, at 62.
95. See, e.g., Stephen R. Shalom, International Lawyers & Other Apologists: The Case of the
Cuban Missile Crisis, 12 POLITY 83 (1979); Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L.
546, 559 (1963).
96. Wright, supra note 95, at 559.
97. Id. at 558.
98. Id.
99. Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 34.
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permanent expulsion of a member state would, by breaking the treaty, free
that state of its obligations under a guarantee clause. The Cuban case falls
somewhere between these two poles, and as a result, it is perhaps fair to
conclude that there are "soft spots" in the argument for its legality.1
0
B. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
Intervention in Grenada in 1983
Authorization by the OECS was an important part of the Reagan
administration's argument that the U.S.-led invasion of Grenada in 1983
complied with international law. The events leading up to the invasion dated
to 1979 when Maurice Bishop led a coup against the Grenadian government
and began to strengthen the island nation's ties to the Soviet Union and Cuba.
By 1981, the U.S. government was accusing Grenada of planning to help the
Soviet Union and Cuba transport arms to communist guerillas in Central
America.
In mid-October 1983, Grenadian Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard,
a hard-line Marxist, seized power and executed Bishop. Tensions flared over
the next few days as pro-Bishop protesters clashed with government forces
loyal to Coard, and the Reagan administration grew concerned that the unrest
could destabilize Grenada and possibly its neighbors in the eastern Caribbean.
It was also worried that widespread violence would affect several hundred
Americans attending medical school in Grenada. On October 24, 1983,
Reagan authorized military action, and the following day the U.S. Marines,
joined by small contingents from Barbados, Jamaica, and other Caribbean
nations, invaded the island.
Reagan administration officials offered three distinct legal rationales for
this invasion: the need to protect American nationals; an invitation by Sir Paul
Scoon, the British Governor-General; and authorization by the Organization
of Eastern Caribbean States. This Section considers the third U.S. rationale.' 01
The OECS had been established in 1981 by seven eastern Caribbean
nations. 102 Its constitutive act primarily provided for joint action on trade,
economic, and cultural issues.' ° 3 Article 8 also established a Defense and
Security Committee to "advise the [OECS Governing Authority] on matters
relating to external defence and on arrangements for collective security
against external aggression .. .with or without the support of internal or
national elements." 1 The OECS's Governing Authority was empowered to
"make such recommendations and give such directives as it deems necessary
for the achievement of the purposes of the [OECS]."' °5 Decisions required
"the affirmative vote of all Member States present and voting ...provided
100. CHAYES, supra note 80, at 62.
101. For a detailed analysis of the other legal justifications, see Robert J. Beck, International
Law and the Decision to Invade Grenada- A Ten-Year Retrospective, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 765 (1993).
102. Antigua and Barbuda, Dorninica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and
St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
103. See Treaty Establishing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States art. 3, June 18, 1981,
1338 U.N.T.S. 97 [hereinafter OECS Treaty].
104. Id. art. 8, § 3.
105. Id. art. 6,§6.
Modern-Day "Guarantee Clauses"
that such decisions shall have no force and effect until ratified by those




On October 21, 1983, the OECS voted to break relations with the
Grenadian government and to impose sanctions on the country.'0 7 On October
24, the OECS authorized military intervention in Grenada, but since the
eastern Caribbean states lacked the resources to mount an effective invasion, it
was clear that the United States-which may have lobbied the organization to
provide authorization-would provide the bulk of the military force. In its
statement announcing the authorization of military force, the OECS tried to fit
circumstances into the collective self-defense provisions of its treaty by
emphasizing its concern that Grenada posed a regional threat: "Three
governments have responded to the OECS member governments request to
form a multinational force for the purpose of undertaking a preemptive
defensive strike in order to remove this dangerous threat to the peace and
security of their sub-region ..... ,108
The Reagan administration relied heavily on this authorization in its
legal defense of the American invasion. Secretary of State George P. Schultz
explained that
the President received an urgent request from the countries closest to the area-the
Organization of East[em] Caribbean States-who, of course, followed these
developments closely over a long period of time ... and who determined for themselves
that there were developments of grave concern to their safety and peace taking place.
They ... made a request to the United States to help them in their desire to insure peace
and stability in their area .... And so, in response to the request of this organization, and
in line [with] a request that they made pursuant to Article 8 of their treaty bringing the
states together, the President decided to respond to their request and to look after the
welfare of American citizens in this atmosphere of uncertainty and violence.I9
Leaders of other states involved in the intervention echoed Schultz. The
Jamaican Prime Minister, for example, said that because of the OECS request
for a military intervention, "the government of Jamaica decided to engage its
Defence Force in a multinational military action to carry out a preemptive
strike to remove the threat to peace and security in the area. ' 10
In light of the language of the OECS treaty, this purported legal
justification fails under the legal framework outlined in Part III of this Note.
The language of the OECS charter's defense provisions, which authorized
action against "external aggression,"' 11 simply did not authorize the use of
force under the circumstances present in late 1983: there was virtually no
evidence that Grenada was planning to engage in aggressive acts, and the
weapons found on the island were primarily defensive in nature. As one
106. Id. art. 6, § 5.
107. Press Release, Org. of E. Caribbean States (undated), reprinted in WILLIAM C. GILMORE,
THE GRENADA INTERVENTION: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTATION 92 (1984).
108. Press Release, Org. of E. Caribbean States, Position on Crisis in Grenada (Oct. 26, 1983),
reprinted in INSTITUTE OF CARIBBEAN STUDIES, DOCUMENTS ON THE INVASION OF GRENADA 85 (1983)
[hereinafter GRENADA DOCUMENTS].
109. George P. Schultz, U.S. Sec'y of State, News Conference in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 26,
1983), reprinted in GRENADA DOCUMENTS, supra note 108, at 19.
110. Edward Seaga, Jam. Prime Minister, Statement on Developments in Grenada (Oct. 25,
1983), reprinted in GRENADA DOCUMENTS, supra note 108, at 73.
111. OECS Treaty, supra note 103, art. 8. See also GILMORE, supra note 107, at 43-44.
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commentator put it, the OECS never "demonstrated how an island state with
no air or naval force at its command could actually undertake such a military
initiative" against its neighbor.
1 12
C. The Economic Community of West African States Intervention in
Liberia in 1990
Authorization by the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) served as a legal basis for the Nigerian-led West African
intervention in Liberia beginning in 1990. The Liberian civil war had broken
out a year earlier when rebel leader Charles Taylor launched a cross-border
invasion from the C6te D'Ivoire (Ivory Coast). Within months, Taylor's
forces threatened to topple the incumbent Liberian regime of Samuel Doe and
sparked a humanitarian catastrophe in the countryside.
ECOWAS had been founded in 1975 as an economic association of
West African nations.' 13 Although ECOWAS's foundational treaty made no
reference to collective security provisions, in 1981 ECOWAS member states
signed a mutual defense agreement resolving "to give mutual aid and
assistance for defense against any armed threat or aggression." ' 14 The defense
agreement was broadly framed and authorized ECOWAS to "examine general
problems concerning peace and security of the Community" and to "decide on
the expediency of the military action."115 It authorized armed force against "an
external armed threat or aggression"116 and also "[i]n the case where an
internal conflict in a Member State of the Community is actively maintained
and sustained from outside," though it precluded intervention "if the conflict
remains purely internal." 117 ECOWAS decisions relating to defense were
"immediately enforceable on Member States." 118 Yet despite the broad
language of the treaty, by 1990 no troops had been assigned to serve under the
treaty's collective security provisions.
Confronted with spreading violence and human suffering in Liberia,
ECOWAS established a Standing Mediation Committee to investigate the
conflict in May 1990. Three months later the Committee established the
ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and authorized it "'to
conduct military operations for the purpose of monitoring the ceasefire,
restoring law and order to create the necessary conditions for free and fair
elections to be held in Liberia' and to aid the 'release of all political prisoners
112. GILMORE, supra note 107, at 54.
113. Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of West African States, May 28, 1975,
1010 U.N.T.S. 17 [hereinafter ECOWAS Charter].
114. Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defense art. 3, May 29, 1981, 1690 U.N.T.S. 52
[hereinafter ECOWAS Defense Treaty].
115. Id. art 6.
116. Id. art. 16.
117. Id. art. 18.
118. Id. art. 6.
119. Georg Nolte, Restoring Peace by Regional Action: International Legal Aspects of the
Liberian Conflict, 53 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT
[Heidelberg Journal of International Law] 603, 615 (1993).
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and prisoners of war."'' 20 Nigerian-led West African forces landed in
Monrovia, Liberia's capital, shortly thereafter.
Initially, ECOWAS defended the legality of its intervention by general
humanitarian principles, not ECOWAS's treaties. In its letter notifying the
United Nations of the action, for example, ECOWAS stated that it "must
emphasize that the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is going to
Liberia first and foremost to stop the senseless killing of innocent civilian
nationals and foreigners, and to help the Liberian people to restore their
democratic institutions.' 2 1 A December 1990 letter to the United Nations
cited an ECOWAS nonaggression pact, but made no reference to the defense
treaty. 122
By late 1990, however, it appears that ECOWAS had begun to cite the
mutual defense treaty as part of its justification for the intervention. In a
November public statement, for example, the ECOWAS Secretary General
made reference "to the ECOWAS mutual defense protocol which was an
agreement for member states to come to each others' aid and assistance in
case of a threat to the sovereign integrity of member states"123 in discussing
the intervention.
During its early phases, the ECOWAS intervention faced little
international criticism,124 and in fact, it arguably received ex post ratification
by the United Nations. Although the United Nations initially took no formal
action regarding the intervention, in 1992, pursuant to a request from
ECOWAS, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Liberia while
excluding weapons and other supplies destined for ECOMOG's forces in the
country. The resolution also commended ECOWAS "for its efforts to restore
peace, stability, and security in Liberia."' 25 The following year, the United
Nations created the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)
and formally placed U.N. observers in the country to monitor and supervise
ECOMOG forces.1
26
120. Herbert Howe, Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping, 21 INT'L
SECURITY 145, 151-52 (1996-97) (quoting ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC
(Aug. 1, 1990)).
121. Letter from Ibrahim A. Gambari, Permanent Representative of Nig., to Javier Perez de
Cu6llar, Sec'y-Gen. of the United Nations (Aug. 10, 1990), reprinted in U.N. Doc. S/21485.
122. Letter from Ousman A. Sallah, Permanent Representative of Gam., to Javier Perez de
Cudllar, Sec'y-Gen. of the United Nations (Dec. 21, 1990), reprinted in U.N. Doc S/22025. ECOWAS
also could arguably have relied on the consent of Doe, who initially welcomed the intervention.
However, it chose not to do so, probably because of widespread disgust with the Doe regime's own
human rights abuses, a sense that the collapsing regime could not legally authorize such intervention,
and because ECOWAS did not wish to be seen as taking sides in the civil war. See Wippman, supra note
80, at 224-28.
123. Nolte, supra note 119, at 614.
124. Later, as the civil war dragged, ECOWAS was criticized for supporting human rights
abuses and for failing to maintain order in Liberia. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAGING WAR TO
KEEP THE PEACE: THE ECOMOG INTERVENTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1993), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/liberia.
125. S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (Nov. 19, 1992).
126. Chiyuki Aoi, Conditions for Change in the Norms Governing Humanitarian Intervention:
National Interest, Human Rights, and Justifiability of Intervention 109 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with Library Storage Facility, Yale University).
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This U.N. involvement in ECOWAS's Liberia operation has been
characterized as "retroactive approval" of the intervention, 127 and as such, the
United Nation's own actions might be understood as providing a legal basis
for the intervention. 28 The treaty-based framework developed in Part III,
however, does not appear to provide a legal justification for the intervention
since ECOWAS failed to comply with its own treaty provisions when
authorizing the use of force. Although the ECOWAS mutual defense treaty's
language was, in theory, broad enough to permit intervention-there was
widespread evidence of regional involvement in the conflict and that the civil
war, if left unchecked, would threaten the stability of neighboring states129
-
ECOWAS's decision to intervene was marked by procedural irregularities that
resulted from a split between Anglophone states who favored intervention and
Francophone states who generally opposed it. As a result, ECOMOG was
initially authorized by an ECOWAS Monitoring Committee comprised of just
five member states, not ECOWAS itself-which would appear to be a
requirement of compliance with the ECOWAS treaty language then in effect.
While the Monitoring Committee had been established by a unanimous vote
of ECOWAS, scholars have noted that "it is quite unlikely . . . that the
[ECOWAS] Authority at its meeting.., had consciously given a mandate to
five countries to set up and employ an intervention force in their name,"
1 3 0
and at the start of the intervention Burkina Faso (an ECOWAS member)
"disputed that an appropriate authorization had in fact been given."
'131
Since its intervention in Liberia, however, ECOWAS has acted as
though it believes treaty clauses can provide a solid legal basis for authorizing
future interventions, significantly revising its treaty provisions to provide
explicit guidelines and more effective procedures for military intervention in
member states. A 1999 ECOWAS Conflict Protocol signed by ECOWAS
heads of state explicitly authorizes ECOWAS to intervene under a variety of
defined circumstances, including humanitarian disasters, human rights crimes,
and attempts to topple democratic governments.' 32 In order to prevent a repeat
of the procedural irregularities that marked the 1990 intervention, decisions to
intervene can now be made by two-thirds of voting members present.1 33 Under
ECOWAS's new agreements, an intervention similar to the 1993 Liberia
intervention would likely conform to the legal framework developed in Part II
of this Note.
127. Eleanor Lumsden, An Uneasy Peace: Multilateral Military Intervention in Civil Wars, 35
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 795, 818 (2003).
128. See Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts, 12
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 333, 347 (1998) (arguing that U.N. resolutions "placed a retroactive dejure
seal on the ECOWAS intervention").
129. Indeed, Liberia's collapse played a major role in the outbreak civil war in neighboring
Sierra Leone.
130. Nolte, supra note 119, at 616.
131. Id. ECOMOG also failed to coordinate its intervention with the Doe government (though,
as noted, Doe expressly invited the intervention), a possible violation of a defense treaty provision
requiring that "in case of internal armed conflict .... [T]he Authority shall appreciate and decide on this
situation in full collaboration with the Authority of the Member State or States concerned." ECOWAS
Defense Treaty, supra note 114, art. 4, para. b.
132. ECOWAS Conflict Protocol, supra note 2, art. 25.
133. Id. art. 9.
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D. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Intervention in Kosovo
in 1999
In 1998 and early 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under
President Slobodan Milogevi6 launched a brutal campaign against ethnic
Albanians living in Yugoslavia's Kosovo province. Despite international
outcry, Russia, a Milogevi6 ally, blocked any significant U.N. response. Faced
with mounting domestic political pressure to prevent a reprise of the bloody
war that had engulfed Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s, western
political leaders threatened military action, and in March of 1999, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began bombing Yugoslavia in a bid to
halt the ethnic cleansing. After a campaign of nearly three months, Milosevic
accepted a U.N.-run, NATO-staffed peacekeeping force that largely ended the
violence in Kosovo.
NATO was founded in the aftermath of World War II, and was-and
remains-a mutual defense pact between the United States and Western
European nations. Its foundational document, the North Atlantic Treaty,
provides for mutual consultation between NATO member states "whenever, in
the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or
security of any of the Parties is threatened,"'' 34 and further provides that in
case of an attack against a NATO member, each signatory "will assist the
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert
with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of
armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic
area."13
5
Under the framework developed in Part III of this Note, however,
NATO's treaty provided no legal basis for the action in Kosovo: it simply
lacks language providing a basis for authorizing the use of force for purposes
other than self-defense. More importantly, Yugoslavia was never a NATO
member and thus could not have given its consent to any language authorizing
the intervention. Indeed, in discussing the basis for the bombing campaign,
NATO leaders relied on general humanitarian principles, not specific treaty
language. For example, President Clinton stated:
We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military
offensive. We act to prevent a wider war; to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe
that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results. And we act to
stand united with our allies for peace. By acting now we are upholding our values,
protecting our interests and advancing the cause of peace.
36
This focus on humanitarianism has been echoed in the scholarly literature
regarding the Kosovo campaign; as discussed in Part II, scholars who defend
it tend to argue either that it was supported by a general principle of
international law permitting intervention for humanitarian purposes, or,
alternatively, that the campaign was illegal but nonetheless justified on
134. North Atlantic Treaty art. 4, Apr 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
135. Id. art. 5.
136. Bill Chnton, President of the U.S., Address on NATO Action in Kosovo (Mar. 24, 1999),
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/jan-june99/address_3-24.html.
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utilitarian grounds. Scholars have, however, argued that NATO's status as a
regional organization contributed to the legitimacy of the 1999 campaign, if
not its legality. Ruth Wedgwood, for example, wrote that "[a]nother of the
elements that bolsters NATO's action is the role of regional organizations
under the Charter" and referenced a statement by a U.N. ambassador citing the
ECOWAS precedent in support of NATO's action.' 37 She also pointed out
that action by a regional organization, rather than unilateral intervention, can
help to achieve important policy purposes, such as "to guard against partiality,
to avoid escalation of conflicts by inadvertent provocation of important actors,
and to invoke the authority of a broad normative community."'
' 38
E. Intervention by the African Union in a Member State
When the Organization for African Unity reinvented itself as the African
Union in 2000, it included a provision in its Charter, Article 4(h), expressly
authorizing the AU "to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of
the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity."' 39 The AU is empowered to make
decisions by consensus or, failing that, by a vote of two-thirds of the AU's
members. 14 In 2002, the AU took further steps to implement these provisions
by establishing a Peace and Security Council charged with, inter alia,
monitoring developing conflicts and making recommendations about when the
Assembly should intervene in a conflict pursuant to the guarantee clause.141 It
also established an African Standby Force to execute decisions made pursuant
to the AU's collective security provisions.
142
The AU authorized the deployment of peacekeepers to Sudan's Darfur
province in 2005, though the treaty was not a necessary legal basis for the
deployment, in light of Sudan's acquiescence to the operation. 43 The United
Nations has also provided express authorization for the AU's mission in
Darfur, though resource shortages and the intransigence of the Sudanese
government have contributed to ongoing violence. Under the framework
developed in Part III, however, the AU's treaty authority alone would have
provided sufficient authority for a mission to stop the genocide in Darfur. The
AU Charter's language clearly permits intervention to stop genocide and
provides a procedural mechanism-a two-thirds majority-that could override
Sudanese objections.
What do these case studies tell us about the guarantee clauses?
Widespread acceptance of the legitimacy and, for some scholars, the legality
of the Kosovo campaign as discussed in Part II, suggests that interventions
137. Wedgwood, supra note 40, at 832.
138. Id
139. AU Charter, supra note 1, art. 4, para. h.
140. Id. art. 7.
141. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union art. 7(e) (entered into force Dec. 26, 2003) [hereinafter AU Peace and Security
Protocol], available at http://www.africa-union.org/Official_documents/
Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf
142. Id. art. 13.
143. INT'L CRISIS GROUP, THE AU's MISSION IN DARFUR: BRIDGING THE GAPS 4-5 (2005),
available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3547&l = 1.
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can be defended on consequentialist grounds and do not require a particular
legal basis to achieve at least a degree of legitimacy. The other case studies,
however, suggest that states remain drawn to legal rationales for intervention
and routinely cite even weak treaty language as providing legal authority for
their actions. The framework developed in Part III provides a method for
evaluating the legality of intervention purportedly authorized by treaty (other
than in self-defense)-though it is important to keep in mind that other legal
justifications may support a given intervention even if it does not comply with
the framework. Given that recent years have seen both the AU and ECOWAS
adopt guarantee clauses that formally permit intervention for humanitarian
purposes-and the sad realities of ongoing strife on the African continent-it
seems likely that guarantee clauses will play a significant role in providing
legal authority for interventions the future. This Note suggests that
interventions pursuant to these clauses have the advantage of being not just
legitimate, but legal.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
This Note has argued that guarantee clauses can provide regional
organizations legal authority to use guarantee clauses to authorize intervention
against member states, and that, by doing so, they offer a partial mechanism
for filling the gap between the law and the legitimacy of the use of force. This
Part addresses three distinct sets of policy questions that must be considered
when drafting a guarantee clause: scope, process, and resources. The first two
of these, the scope of a guarantee clause and the process of authorizing an
intervention, are critical to balancing flexibility and the potential for abuse;
the first by placing substantive limits on the circumstances under which the
guarantee clause applies, and the second by placing procedural limits on any
authorization for the use of force. The final consideration, resources, is critical
to ensuring that any intervention is successful.
Regional organizations drafting a guarantee clause must strike a delicate
balance in defining its scope, which specifies the circumstances under which
the clause authorizes the use of force. Broadly defined guarantee clauses can
grant a regional organization legal authority to use force when necessary to
deal with myriad, often unforeseen threats. On the other hand, a broad clause
may open the door to abuse-a clause worded too broadly could permit
intervention under circumstances that would not have been acceptable to a
nation at the time that it ratified the clause, and could provide an opening for a
powerful nation to abuse guarantee clauses to serve its own national interests.
The AU's guarantee clause, which recognizes its authority to intervene to
,, 144prevent "war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, offers a
possible model compromise. War crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity all have discrete legal content in international law, but collectively
cover a wide enough range of activities that the AU could rely on the clause to
provide authority for action against a variety of state abuses. The ECOWAS
144. AU Charter, supra note 1, art. 4, para. h.
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clause, which authorizes interventions for similar purposes as well as pro-
democratic interventions, strikes a comparative balance.
A similar balancing task is required when designing the procedural
mechanism that triggers action pursuant to a guarantee clause: the procedure
must be speedy and flexible enough to permit action to confront a range of
circumstances, but robust enough to prevent individual states from misusing
guarantee clauses to pursue their own narrow national interests. The AU and
ECOWAS both established a two-thirds supermajority vote as the threshold
required to commit to military action, which presumably reflects concerns that
a U.N. Security Council-style unanimity requirement has hindered the U.N.'s
ability to prevent crises. 14 5 This type of supermajority requirement offers a
reasonable balance between the need for flexibility and the fear of abuse.
Guarantee clauses should also stipulate that they remain in full force and
effect even if a government is suspended from participation in a regional
organization because the government is engaging in behavior that the
guarantee clause was designed to prevent. Language to this effect would
clarify cases like the 1962 Cuban blockade, where it was unclear whether
Cuba remained bound by the Rio Treaty's provisions.
Negotiators drafting a guarantee clause could also consider establishing
a quasi-independent dispute resolution mechanism that could adjudicate
disputes related to guarantee clauses, for example, arguments that the
particular facts on the ground failed to meet the circumstances required for
action pursuant to a particular guarantee clause. From a purely theoretical
perspective a quasi-independent dispute resolution mechanism has a great deal
of appeal: it would face fewer political pressures in interpreting the scope of a
clause, and a favorable opinion could add a degree of legitimacy to a
particular intervention, while an unfavorable one might be able to prevent the
misuse of force. Practically speaking, however, a regional organization
considering establishing a dispute resolution mechanism would have to deal
with the fact that decisions on intervention must typically be made quickly,
while dispute resolution mechanisms can take months, if not years, to resolve
contested issues. The existence of a dispute resolution mechanism might also
serve as a barrier to acceptance of a guarantee clause if potential member
states prove reluctant to turn decisions about the use of force-something that
has historically been seen as the prerogative of the executive branches of
national governments-over to a quasi-judicial body.
The initial decision to use force is only the first step of any intervention
pursuant to a guarantee clause, and the procedures used to carry out an
intervention are perhaps equally important: a badly-executed intervention can
do more harm than good. Both the AU and ECOWAS have established
permanent institutions (the AU Peace and Security Council and the ECOWAS
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Resolution, and Peace-keeping) tasked
145. The OAS also requires a two-thirds supermajority vote to authorize action. The three
regional organizations differ, however, on whether the two-thirds requirement is of signatories or
members present at the meeting authorizing force. ECOWAS and the AU permit decisions on the
affirmative vote of two-thirds of those voting; the OAS requires two-thirds of signatory states. See AU
Peace and Security Protocol, supra note 141, art. 8, § 13; ECOWAS Conflict Protocol, supra note 2, art.
9; Rio Treaty, supra note 83, art. 17.
Modern-Day "Guarantee Clauses
with organizing and coordinating interventions. 146 The AU's Peace and
Security Council is also charged with monitoring regional developments to
provide an early warning of situations that may threaten regional peace or the
domestic security of a member nation's citizens, 147 and with establishing an
African Standby Force that can be used for a variety of purposes, including
interventions pursuant to the AU's guarantee clause. 148 Although both the AU
and ECOWAS are hampered by resource shortages-an issue discussed
immediately below-the existence of these permanent institutions provides an
important foundation for any intervention pursuant to either organization's
guarantee clauses. Other regional organizations considering drafting guarantee
clauses should consider creating similar institutions.
A third, related set of policy considerations surround the limited
resources that regional organizations, particularly those in the developing
world, can tap to intervene in a conflict. Developing-world militaries
frequently lack advanced weaponry and the logistical capabilities-ships,
planes, and trucks-required to project and supply forces across national
boundaries. Soldiers are often poorly trained and even officers lack the basic
material required to mount an effective intervention. For example, ECOMOG
commanders reportedly planned the initial invasion of Liberia's capital using
a tourist map of the city and lacked adequate maps until they were provided
by the American military; 149 the overall efficacy of the intervention has been
criticized.
150
Given these realities, western nations should consider expanding
existing programs that partner with regional organizations that have
implemented guarantee clauses to offer training and military equipment they
could then use to mount effective interventions. The United States, for
example, has provided about $278 million over the last three years to train and
equip African forces for peacekeeping missions,15 1 funds that have been used
to train some 26,000 soldiers. 152 Greater logistical assistance, both for long-
term training and during the immediate run-up and early part of a particular
intervention, would help to maximize an intervention's effectiveness. Direct
military support of a given intervention, like targeted airstrikes in support of a
regional organization's own forces, offer another area for possible assistance.
In addition to training, western nations should consider offering direct
financial assistance to regional organizations acting pursuant to a guarantee
clause, at least for interventions intended to protect human rights-a cause to
which western nations have, historically, been reluctant to commit their own
military forces. The European Union has already authorized several hundred
million euros to help African nations defray the costs of regional
146. AU Peace and Security Protocol, supra note 141, art. 6; ECOWAS Conflict Protocol,
supra note 2, art. 6.
147. AU Peace and Security Protocol, supra note 141, art. 6(b).
148. Id. art. 13.
149. Howe, supra note 120, at 164.
150. Id. at 146. Howe argues that the lessons of ECOMOG's intervention show that "an
inadequate peacekeeping force may.. prolong a war and weaken regional stability." Id.
151. Serafino, supra note 3, summary.
152. Id.at2l.
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peacekeeping missions, including the AU's mission in Darfur. 153 While these
sums represent a considerable commitment on the part of the EU, they fall far
short of the sums required to execute a major intervention. During
ECOWAS's intervention in Liberia it was estimated that Nigeria, which
provided the bulk of the military forces and other supplies, spent as much as
one million U.S. dollars per day.' 54 A significant financial commitment by
western nations to help underwrite interventions pursuant to, for example, the
AU's guarantee clause, would encourage AU member states to commit their
own forces to humanitarian interventions knowing that international assistance
would be available to help defray their direct costs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Modem guarantee clauses are far from perfect. A regional organization
with clear treaty provisions and a sound process to authorize the use of force
may end up using force improperly, or, conversely, failing to intervene when
it should. It also seems unlikely that guarantee clauses will provide a legal
basis for intervening to stop all human rights abuses in light of the fact that the
worst offenders may be unlikely to enter into agreements authorizing the use
of force against them-although the African Union's Charter is a promising
sign that states are willing, at least on paper, to commit to permitting
intervention for humanitarian purposes. But such treaties are a step in the right
direction and offer a way of balancing the need to protect human rights and
provide collective security against the risks inherent in any system that
permits the use of force. Achieving that balance in a way that subjects state
action to rules is a central purpose of international law.
153. Press Release, Eur. Union, Creation of a Peace Facility for Africa (Dec. 11, 2003),
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12529.htm.
154. Norimitsu Onishi, What War Has Wrought: Sierra Leone's Sad State, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
1999, at A6.
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